Linking lifestyle politics and state-oriented action by de Moor, Joost et al.
Joost de Moor, Sofie Marien, Marc Hooghe  
University of Leuven, Center for Citizenship and 
Democracy,  
Parkstraat 45,  
B-3000 Leuven (Belgium), 
Joost.deMoor@soc.kuleuven.be  
  
  
  
  
  
LINKING LIFESTYLE POLITICS AND STATE-
ORIENTED ACTION 
 -  
A MIXED-METHODS INQUIRY INTO FORMS OF 
ENGAGEMENT AMONG LIFESTYLE ACTIVISTS IN A 
BELGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Paper presented at the ECPR Summer School on 
Methods for the Study of Participation and Mobilization  
Florence, 16-27 September 2013  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Lifestyle politics has often been defined as a political strategy used to avoid 
institutional politics. However, recent studies have indicated that to varying degrees, 
lifestyle activists may engage in state-oriented action as well. The current study 
investigates why some lifestyle activists combine both forms of engagement, while 
others do not. It is questioned whether such differences can be explained by 
variations in activists’ perceptions of the political opportunity structure. In 
particular, it will be examined whether input or output structures offer relevant 
predictors to this extent. The paper presents an in-depth case-study of a Belgian 
environmental lifestyle movement organization, based on a triangulation of methods – 
participant observations, qualitative interviewing, and surveys. Contrary to the 
literature’s focus on input structures, findings suggest that lifestyle activists’ 
propensity for state-oriented action is mainly affected by their beliefs in the state’s 
ability to address environmental concerns, i.e., its output structure.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Lifestyle politics is on the rise, whereas traditional forms of political participation are 
declining (Stolle & Hooghe, 2005, 2011). To advance social change, citizens are 
increasingly committed to change their own lifestyles, and to persuade their fellow 
citizens to do so as well. As such, lifestyle politics contrasts state-oriented action, 
which seeks to foster social change by targeting the political decision making process 
(Norris, 2002, p. 193). Emphasizing this contrast, lifestyle politics has often been 
interpreted as a strategy to advance social change while allowing activists to avoid the 
institutional political arena (Eliasoph, 2001; for a discussion see: Lichterman, 1995). 
However, this interpretation has been challenged. Recent studies have shown that 
within lifestyle movements, some activists engage in state-oriented action as well 
(Dubuisson-Quellier, Lamine, & Le Velly, 2011; Graziano & Forno, 2012; Haydu & 
Kadanoff, 2010). Building on these studies, the aim of this paper is to increase our 
understanding of what motivates some lifestyle activists’ to engage in state-oriented 
action more than others. 
Lifestyle politics include individualized forms of engagement such as ethical 
consumption (Micheletti, Follesdal, & Stolle, 2004; van Deth, 2011), but also the 
collective promotion of lifestyle change (Haenfler, Johnson, & Jones, 2012). 
Concerning the latter, we witness a growing interest in the study of lifestyle activists 
who organize in lifestyle movement organizations (LMOs) (Balsiger, forthcoming, 
2010; Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011; Graziano & Forno, 2012). LMOs collectively 
foster social change by challenging dominant ideas and practices in society (e.g., 
those related to consumerism), and in some cases by challenging political authorities 
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as well. Therefore, they are increasingly depicted as a type of social movement 
organization (Haenfler et al., 2012; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010; Snow, 2004). As a 
result, the study of lifestyle politics increasingly draws upon insights from social 
movement literature (Balsiger, 2010; Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011; Haenfler et al., 
2012).  
We also build on the social movement literature, and in particular, on the 
political opportunity structure theory (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). We study whether lifestyle activists’ propensity for 
state-oriented action is related to their perceptions of the political opportunity 
structure (POS), as it poses incentives and disincentives for state-oriented action 
(Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010; Tarrow, 1996). Within the POS 
literature an important distinction is made between the input and output structure of 
the political system. Input structures refer to governments’ propensity to take the 
claims of citizens into account, whereas output structures refer to the ability of 
governments to translate such claims into public policy (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 
1995). Thus far, most empirical studies have focused on the perceived input structure 
to explain levels of state-oriented action among social movement activists, while 
empirical studies on the output structure remain scarce. Therefore, this study aims to 
investigate the effect of activists’ perceptions of both input and output structures on 
their propensity to engage in state-oriented participation.  
This paper presents an in-depth case-study of a Belgian environmental 
lifestyle movement organization called VELT (Vereniging voor Ecologisch Leven en 
Tuinieren, or Organization for Ecological Living and Gardening). VELT offers a 
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most-likely case that allows to explore whether differences between activists’ 
preferences for particular forms of engagement are the result of their perceptions of 
the POS. Firstly, this organization offers the opportunity for individual members to 
engage in both lifestyle politics and state-oriented action, as both are part of the 
organization’s action repertoire. Secondly, VELT provides its members with a level 
of autonomy that allows them to draw upon this action repertoire according to their 
personal preferences. Hence, if preferences for combining lifestyle politics and state-
oriented action are affected by individuals’ perceptions of the POS, it is likely that we 
observe such effects in this case. 
The current study builds on a triangulation of methods. To gain a deep 
understanding of how VELT’s members attribute meaning to their actions, in 
discourse and in practice, qualitative interviews and participant observation are 
conducted. In a next step, the findings derived from interviews and observations are 
tested for robustness by means of a quantitative evaluation of a member-survey. The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will help to increase the 
inferential leverage of this study (Tarrow, 2004). 
In the following section, we will start by reviewing the relevant literature on 
lifestyle politics and political opportunity structures. We will then discuss case 
selection, methods, and data. Subsequently, we will review the qualitative and 
quantitative findings, followed by a discussion of the theoretical implications of this 
study. 
 
THEORY 
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Lifestyle politics refers to the politicization of citizens’ everyday life choices 
(Giddens, 1991; Micheletti, 2003). In his seminal work on the topic, Giddens (1991) 
describes lifestyle politics as a form of political participation that is characteristic for 
the period of late modernity. This reading of lifestyle politics offers important insights 
as to why citizens are becoming more and more involved in this form of action 
(Bennett, 2012; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005, 2011). On the one hand, identities are 
increasingly grounded in individualized processes of reflexivity, in which lifestyle 
choices form an essential element (Giddens, 1991). On the other hand, globalization 
causes the intrusion of global considerations (e.g., the environment, or economic 
justice) in these processes of reflexivity. This increasingly politicizes lifestyle 
choices. As citizens politicize their lifestyles, they acknowledge that lifestyle choices 
have global implications, and that global considerations should therefore affect 
lifestyle choices as well (Giddens, 1991). For instance, the environmental lifestyle 
movement, which is the focus of this study, builds on the premise that “reversing the 
degradation of the environment depends upon adopting new lifestyle patters (…) [as 
b]y far the greatest amount of ecological damage derives from the modes of life 
followed in the modernized sectors of world society.” (Giddens, 1991, p. 221). 
Based on extant literature we can subdivide lifestyle politics into two forms of 
engagement. First, lifestyle politics can refer to an engagement of reshaping one’s 
own lifestyle according to certain principles (Micheletti & Stolle, 2011). This form of 
lifestyle politics will be referred to as social responsibility activism. Second, lifestyle 
politics can refer  to the encouragement of fellow citizens to make such lifestyle 
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changes as well (Haenfler et al., 2012). This form of lifestyle politics will be referred 
to as lifestyle mobilization. The example of vegetarianism is useful to further clarify 
this distinction. While social responsibility activists might adapt their individual 
consumption patterns according to principles of vegetarianism (Micheletti & Stolle, 
2011), lifestyle mobilization would imply an additional engagement to promote 
vegetarianism to the general public, like spreading information about the 
environmental costs of meat-production (Haenfler et al., 2012). 
As a form of political participation that advances social change through the 
politicization of lifestyles, lifestyle politics differs from what Norris calls state-
oriented action (2002). Building on the work of Verba, Nie and Kim (1978),  she 
defines this as “those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly 
aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they 
take” (Norris, 2002, p. 193). In contrast to state-oriented action, lifestyle politics 
targets ‘the arena of everyday life’ (Micheletti, 2003). Despite this sharp distinction, 
however, some recent studies have indicated that activists within lifestyle movement 
organizations (LMOs) sometimes engage in state-oriented action as well, rather than 
to avoid it completely (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011; Graziano & Forno, 2012; 
Haluza-DeLay, 2008; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010). For instance, Graziano and Forno 
(2012) found that activists in the Italian alternative food movement do not exclusively 
focus on promoting ethical consumerism. By contacting politicians and becoming 
active in election campaigns, they sometimes engage in state-oriented action as well. 
Similar results were found within LMOs in France (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011) 
and the USA (Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010). 
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These studies indicate that both lifestyle politics and state-oriented action can 
be part of LMOs tactical repertoires, i.e., of the established forms of action they draw 
upon to challenge dominant ideas and practices in society, and to direct claims at 
political authorities (Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, & Andersen, 2009; Tilly, 1995). 
However, at the same time it is found that individual activists draw upon LMOs’ 
tactical repertoires according to their personal preferences (Balsiger, forthcoming). 
Following this logic, we can distinguish between activists who combine lifestyle 
politics and state-oriented action from those who do not (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 
2011). This distinction is crucial for our understanding of the role lifestyle politics 
plays in the context of changing patterns of political participation, and its effect on the 
link between citizens and the democratic system (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 2002; 
Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). While lifestyle activists who engage in state-oriented action 
do not seem to avoid the institutional democratic system, those who engage only in 
lifestyle politics might. Nonetheless, to our knowledge no study has investigated why 
only some lifestyle activists engage in state-oriented action. The aim of this paper is 
to address this gap in the literature, by explaining why some lifestyle activists involve 
in both forms of engagement, while others do not. 
 
Political opportunity structures and forms of political participation 
 
Within the social movement literature the political opportunity structure (POS) is 
considered one of the most important predictors of activists’ propensity for certain 
forms of engagement (Kriesi et al., 1995; Opp, 2009; Tarrow, 1996). Relative to 
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different policy fields, the POS poses “consistent (…) dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success and failure” (Tarrow, 1996, p. 85). Several 
empirical studies indeed show that variations in activists’ propensity to engage in 
state-oriented action can be explained by differences in their perceptions of the POS 
(Alimi, Gamson, & Ryan, 2006; Diani, 1996; Shriver & Adams, 2013). 
 Within the POS literature a distinction has been made between input structures 
and output structures (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995). The input structure, on the 
one hand, defines the POS in terms of the likelihood that governments will take into 
account citizens’ demands (Kriesi, 2004; Tarrow, 1996). States with an open input 
structure are characterized by a decreasing importance of traditional political 
cleavages, offering room for newly raised issues. They are moreover characterized by 
a territorial decentralization, and have a strong separation of power between political 
institutions, offering more meaningful access points to claims-makers (Kriesi, 2004). 
This way, open input structures offer stronger incentives for state-oriented action than 
closed ones.  
The output structure, on the other hand, describes the state’s ability to translate 
citizens’ claims into the effective development and implementation of public policies 
(Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 2004). An effective output structure can therefore function as 
an incentive for government oriented political participation as well, since activists 
will believe that the politicians they address can actually solve their problems. Indeed, 
Norris (2011) finds that as citizens perceive the state’s output structure as more 
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responsive they become more likely to engage in government oriented political 
participation. 
 Empirical studies within the POS literature have focused predominantly on 
input structures, while disregarding output structures. This seems remarkable, since 
processes related to transnationalization and the expansion of global governance 
underscores the growing importance of the output structure as an incentive for state-
oriented action (Bennett, 2012; della Porta, 2013; Norris, 2002; Tarrow, 2009). States 
are increasingly losing power to non-state actors, such as international government 
organizations. As a result, the state’s ability to address citizens’ most important 
concerns becomes challenged. This poses a clear disincentive for activists to target 
national governments. Although some social movements have increasingly started to 
address international government organizations, transnational activism is costly, and 
international institutions are often considered as lacking sufficient democratic access 
points (della Porta, 2013; Tarrow, 2009). Therefore, citizens who are faced with a 
weak output structure might in some cases focus on lifestyle politics as an alternative 
(Micheletti, 2003; Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005). Hence, while traditionally the 
POS literature has focused on input structures, in the face of transnationalization, 
output structures become increasingly important in explaining the forms of 
engagement activists involve in. Therefore, we expect that perceptions of both input 
and output structures can help to explain lifestyle activists’ propensity to engage in 
state-oriented action. Moreover, we expect that if citizens believe that the ability to 
act is in the hands of international government organizations, they will be less likely 
to target the political decision making process.  
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VELT: A BELGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LIFESTYLE ORGANIZATION 
 
To explain differences in lifestyle activists’ individual propensity to engage in state-
oriented action, existing case-studies of LMOs have underscored the importance of 
both the organizational and the individual level (Balsiger, forthcoming; Dubuisson-
Quellier et al., 2011). On the one hand, the organizational context mobilizes 
individual activists to involve in particular forms of engagement. As such, it 
establishes the tactical repertoire individual members can draw upon (Taylor & Van 
Dyke, 2004). On the other hand, individual activists can draw on the organization’s 
tactical repertoire according to their personal preferences, provided that the 
organizational context offers ample flexibility (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Therefore, 
the differences between the two types of lifestyle activists described above can ideally 
be observed within an organizational context that 1) provides a tactical repertoire that 
includes both lifestyle politics and state-oriented strategies, and 2) leaves sufficient 
liberty for its members to individually draw upon this repertoire. Although such 
selection criteria inevitably limit generalizability, recent case-studies confirm that this 
type of LMO is not at all exceptional (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011; Graziano & 
Forno, 2012; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010). 
VELT, one of the largest LMOs within the Belgian context, is a typical 
example of such an organization – i.e., one that offers both the opportunity and the 
liberty for activists to individually engage in lifestyle politics as well as state-oriented 
action. Founded in 1974, VELT is an environmental LMO with approximately 14.000 
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members from Brussels and the Flemish part of Belgium.
1
 The organization has one 
national professional core of 23 employees, but functions largely as a volunteer 
organization divided in 100 local divisions. With its strong focus on ecological 
gardening its origins are mainly rural, yet it currently witnesses growing urban 
divisions. VELT’s primary goal is to promote environmental causes, and in doing so 
it focuses strongly on lifestyle politics. First, in promoting social responsibility 
activism it offers a platform for members to change their lifestyle according to 
ecological principles. Second, through lifestyle mobilization it encourages the general 
public to do so as well. In practice it does so by providing information through printed 
and online media, and by organizing activities that aim at educating people on topics 
related to ecological living, consuming, and gardening. Moreover, previous 
campaigns, such as their struggle for a legal ban on certain uses of pesticides, show 
that state-oriented action is also a part of VELT’s tactical repertoire. 
At the same time, VELT aims at leaving a certain degree of liberty for its 
members to individually draw upon this tactical repertoire. In observing members of 
different local chapters, within this study we observed groups that focus more 
exclusively on lifestyle politics (e.g., VELT Hageland), as well as those where state-
oriented action is more regularly engaged in (e.g., VELT Neer-Brabant). As such, 
VELT offers a most-likely case to examine our hypothesis. While most-likely cases 
often serve the purpose of falsifying hypotheses (‘if an effect is not found in this case, 
it is unlikely that it will be found in a less likely case’), most-likely cases are also 
considered ideal for exploring new hypotheses (Gerring, 2007). In this sense the case 
of VELT supports this study’s exploratory endeavor of examining the link between 
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POSs and forms of engagement. Its members have the opportunity to engage in 
lifestyle politics and state-oriented action, and they have the liberty to do so following 
their personal preferences. If such personal preferences are indeed affected by the 
political opportunities they perceive, like the POS approach predicts (Haydu & 
Kadanoff, 2010; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1996), such an effect should be 
observable in this case. 
 
METHODS 
 
To answer our research questions, this study builds on a triangulation of three 
methods: participant observation, qualitative interviewing, and surveys. While 
participant observation and qualitative interviewing have the advantage of offering a 
deep understanding of activists’ actions and motivations, the interpretative nature of 
qualitative data analysis limits the possibility of assessing the robustness of 
conclusions. Operationalizing the same research questions through a survey will allow 
us to perform quantitative analyses and tests for statistical significance. In effect, 
combining these methods will help to increase the robustness and validity of the 
study’s findings (Tarrow, 2004). 
Firstly, participant observation was conducted in order to study everyday 
interactions through which activists’ motives and actions become observable. 
Namely, “a participant-observer is particularly well positioned to pick up the 
everyday meanings that organize group life, because participant observation takes 
place in the group settings and time frames dictated by the researched (…).” 
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(Lichterman, 2002, p. 138). As a result, such observations serve the ecological 
validity of this study (Lichterman, 1995). From December 2012 till June 2013, 
fourteen gatherings of the organization were observed and documented in field notes 
(see Appendix I for exact dates and locations). These gatherings included courses on 
ecological gardening and ecological consumption; events aimed at informing the 
general public, such as participation in a large eco-fair; meetings of the national and 
local boards; and the organization’s annual members meeting. As this part of the data 
gathering primarily served the goal of recording actions and statements of activists in 
group settings, the fieldworker retained an observing role. 
Secondly, interviews were conducted to capture activists’ records of the 
organization’s activities, their discursive understanding of their membership and 
participation, and their perception of the POS. The interviews were conducted in a 
semi-structured fashion. With this approach, respondents were allowed a large degree 
of liberty to talk broadly about their actions, motivations and experiences. If required, 
the interviewer used funneling techniques to narrow down the topic. Between January 
and June 2013 eleven in-depth interviews were conducted with members of the 
organization (see Appendix II for dates and locations of the interviews). In the 
absence of a readily available pool of potential interviewees,
2
 respondents were 
recruited first, by contacting members present during participant observations, and 
second, through a method of snowball sampling. Interviews were held to the point of 
saturation, which in this study has been defined as the inclusion of activists with 
different levels of involvement in state-oriented action and lifestyle politics. 
Moreover, to include the different levels of the organization, interviewees were 
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selected from national, provincial and local boards, as well as ‘ordinary’ members 
with no managerial functions. 
The interviews, as well as the field notes were transcribed and coded using 
NVivo. Coding was done using both closed and open coding (Lichterman, 2002). 
Closed coding refers to a deductive process in which data are categorized on the basis 
of theoretical concepts. Building on the theoretical framework outlined above, 
perceptions of the POS were coded, as well as statements about the effectiveness of, 
and involvement in, particular forms of engagement. Open coding refers to an 
inductive process where data are coded on the basis of insights from the analysis 
itself. Whenever the interpretation of the data revealed insights that were not 
anticipated theoretically, additions were made to the coding scheme. Subsequently, 
‘queries’ were performed that index overlaps between particular codes. Most 
importantly, such queries were used to retrieve the co-occurrence of codes related to 
particular forms of engagement and to activists’ perception of the POS. This allowed 
us to observe when respondents related their personal preferences for particular forms 
of engagement to their perceptions of the POS. In this way, one is able to retrieve data 
that is relevant to the research question from large amounts of empirical material that 
otherwise remains less intelligible. The quotes from interviews presented in the 
results section below were also obtained in this fashion. 
Finally, a survey was conducted among VELT’s members. The survey was 
conducted in June 2013 as a follow up of the qualitative research. This allowed for the 
questionnaire to not only be informed by deductive, theoretical insights, but also by 
insights from the inductive, qualitative part of the research, increasing the internal 
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validity of the survey. Questionnaires were handed out to all members present at five 
different meetings of the organization (see Appendix I for dates and locations). This 
implies that ‘passive’ members, who donate money to the organization and receive 
their magazine, but who do not participate in gatherings of the organization, are 
outside the scope of this study. Most questionnaires were completed on location (N = 
66), while some respondents completed the survey at home (N = 8). Of the 74 
respondents, four had missing values, and were excluded from the analyses. To 
minimize instrument bias, both groups received self-completion questionnaires. The 
response rate of the survey was 87 percent. 
 
RESULTS 
 
In this section we will start by inquiring to what extent social responsibility 
activism, lifestyle mobilization, and state-oriented action are established forms of 
engagement among members of VELT. We will do so, first, on the basis of qualitative 
data derived from interviews and observations, and second, on  the basis of survey 
data. Subsequently, we will investigate to what extent activists’ perceptions of the 
POS affect their propensity for state-oriented action.  
 The qualitative data indicate that all three forms of engagement outlined above 
are relevant within VELT. Firstly, social responsibility activism is a form of 
engagement commonly operated by VELT’s members. Most interviewees indicated 
that they initially joined the organization because they sought information and skills 
needed to shape their lifestyle according to ecological principles. This is reflected in 
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the majority of the activities organized by the organization, as they focus 
predominantly on offering practical tools for developing an ecological lifestyle. It 
takes form in courses on ecological gardening, information sessions on how to 
recognize organic products, and workshops on how to reduce food waste. Moreover, 
within these activities, it was observed that interactions between members focus 
strongly on the exchange of practical knowledge on ecological lifestyles. Even at 
formal meetings, we witnessed chairs desperately requesting participants not to keep 
entering in discussions on ecological gardening, and to stick more closely to the 
agenda.  
Secondly, in addition to changing their own lifestyles, all interviewees made 
clear that their main motivation, and main envisioned strategy for fostering ecological 
change, was lifestyle mobilization. Through the organization of large public events 
they try to inform and inspire the general public about the possibilities of an 
ecological lifestyle. This is the case, for instance, at the annual national ‘open garden 
day’, where members exhibit their ecological garden. The importance of lifestyle 
mobilization became observable in ongoing discussions about the difficulties of 
approaching till then unreachable parts of the population. Both in interviews and 
during observations, members regularly expressed their concern with the 
effectiveness of the organization in creating a more environmental friendly society, 
since they observed that they were too often ‘preaching to the choir’. This was for 
many members a reason to cooperate with other organizations in order to reach a 
‘different type of adherents’ (e.g., de Gezinsbond, or the Association for Families). 
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Other members requested political institutions to help them communicate their 
message to a wider population. As one local leader states: 
 
That is the big question of how to reach the general public. But that is very difficult. 
How to convince, or rather, how to excite someone for that way of thinking? I think 
that there you have to work together with politics more; with local governments to 
better be able to spread that message. [Interview 4]  
 
This brings us, thirdly, to state-oriented action. Some interviewees perceived a clear 
mutual relationship between lifestyle politics and state-oriented action. On the one 
hand, as described above, some members perceive political institutions as a suited 
vehicle for reaching new adherents. They persuaded local authorities to broadcast the 
movements messages through official communication channels. Moreover, some 
respondents indicated that in organizing small scale projects, like communal gardens, 
they aimed to convince local governments to follow their example and initiate similar 
projects at a larger scale, thereby reaching a broader audience.  
 On the other hand, some members indicated that through lifestyle mobilization 
they could chang public opinion, thereby putting more pressure on politicians to make 
changes. That is, they believed that by raising environmental awareness in society 
through lifestyle mobilization, they could change public opinion and the public’s 
political preferences regarding the environment. Thus, these members believed that, 
by changing the political preferences of the electorate, politicians could more easily 
be pressured to respond to environmental concerns as well. A member of VELT’s 
professional core stated: 
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I don’t think politicians care much about this problem, but they are interested in it as 
soon as part of the electorate stirs and tells them that they need to deal with this 
problem. Then, sooner or later, politicians will have to consider these problems. And 
that’s my point, with our positive message of communal gardening and using less 
pesticides, we can make this happen. [Interview 10] 
 
Thus, some of VELT’s members actively combine lifestyle mobilization with state-
oriented action: they lobby against the use of pesticides, they take part in 
environmental advisory boards, they encourage political parties to include 
environmental issues in their electoral programs, and they write letters to MPs to urge 
them to advocate environmental causes. Thus, the qualitative data suggest that while 
most members of VELT are to some extent involved in social responsibility activism 
and lifestyle mobilization, only part of them combines lifestyle politics and state-
oriented action. Therefore, the main distinction appears to be between those members 
who mainly engage in lifestyle politics, and those who target the institutional political 
arena as well. 
 A similar picture arises from the survey data. Table 1 gives the percentages of 
the variables measuring to what extent respondents’ membership of VELT is 
motivated by lifestyle politics and by state-oriented action (for further descriptives see 
Appendix 3). Lifestyle politics was measured by asking respondents to what extent 
they agreed (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree) with the statement “I am a 
member of VELT to promote an alternative lifestyle”. On a similar scale state-
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oriented action was measured with the statement “I am a member of VELT to 
pressure politicians to make changes”. 
  
<< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
The scores on these items indicate that the survey data are in line with the qualitative 
data. More than 80 percent of the respondents reported that their membership of 
VELT is motivated by the promotion of an alternative lifestyle (43.1 percent of the 
respondents agrees and 41.7 percent totally agrees with the statement). In contrast, 
about a third of the respondents indicated that pressuring politicians motivates their 
membership (22.2 percent of the respondents agrees with the statement, while 15.3 
percent totally agrees).
3
 In line with the qualitative findings, we see that promoting 
lifestyle change and pressuring politicians is rather cumulative: of the respondents 
who indicated that they were motivated by pressuring politicians, nearly everyone 
reported to be motivated by lifestyle politics as well (89 percent, see the shaded area 
in Table 1). To this extent, the quantitative and qualitative data are in line with 
previous studies showing that within LMOs, activists are mainly occupied with 
promoting lifestyle change, but that part of the activists engage in state-oriented 
action as well. In the next section we will investigate why some activists combine 
these forms of engagement, while others do not.  
 
Explaining state-oriented action among lifestyle activists 
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As argued above, we expect that lifestyle activists’ perceptions of the input structure 
and the output structure will affect their likelihood to engage in state-oriented action. 
To test this hypothesis, we will start by performing an analysis of the survey item 
measuring respondents’ motivation to pressure politicians to make changes (see 
Appendix 3 for descriptives). In a second step, we will return to our qualitative data to 
offer a deeper understanding of the presumed link between activists’ perceptions of 
the POS and their propensity for state-oriented action. 
 In order to measure the perceived input structure, respondents were asked to 
what extent they agreed (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree) with five statements 
concerning the input structure (Table 2). The items measure different dimensions of 
the input structure, such as the responsiveness of politicians to environmental 
concerns (item 1); the position of environmental issues on the political agenda (item 2 
and 3); the impact of elite allies on the development of policies (item 4); and the 
tradition of support or repression of environmental movements (item 5). Table 2 
presents the results of the exploratory factor analysis on which this scale is based. All 
five items have a factor loading above .50 and are included in the ‘perceived input 
structure’ scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .74).4 The scores of the items were summed, so 
that respondents with high scores perceive the input structure as more open than 
respondents with low scores.  
 
<< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
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The perceived output structure was measured with a single item. Respondents were 
asked to what extent they agreed with the statement “it is useless to affect politicians, 
because they are not capable of doing anything against environmental problems 
anyway”.5 The variable was coded reversed, so that respondents with higher scores 
perceive the output structure as more effective than respondents with low scores. 
Controlling for age, education,
6
 and gender – which are in the literature often 
put forward as important predictors for political participation (Marien, Hooghe, & 
Quintelier, 2010; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 2002) – a multivariate ordered logistic 
regression was conducted to analyze the effect of the perceived input and output 
structure on respondents’ motivation to pressure politicians. We choose to use an 
ordered logistic regression because the dependent variable is categorical, and because 
a violation of assumptions of the normality and homoscedasticity of residuals 
prohibits the use of an ordinary least squares regression.  
Model I in Table 3 presents the outcomes of this regression. Contrary to what 
the POS theory predicts, no evidence was found that respondents’ perception of the 
input structure is significantly related to their motivation to pressure politicians. In 
contrast, respondents who perceive the output structure as more effective are more 
likely to be motivated to pressures politicians to make changes. In other words, if a 
respondent increases one unit on the perceived output structure variable, his or her 
odds of being in a higher category of the dependent variable becomes approximately 
two times higher. 
 
<< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >> 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
As argued above, citizens’ skepticism about the state’s output structure and their 
abstinence from state-oriented action can be related to global governance and a shift 
of power to international government organizations. To investigate this mechanism, 
we measured respondents’ perceptions of the power of national and international 
politics with the following two statements: “Politicians in my country are able to 
solve environmental problems” and “International politics are able to solve 
environmental problems”.7 
In Model II we introduce these independent variables to our model. The results 
support our hypothesis: while believing that national politics has the power to solve 
environmental problems has a positive effect on respondents’ motivation to pressure 
politicians (Odds ration = 3.623***), believing that international politics has this 
power has a negative effect (Odds ration = .493*). These findings further support the 
idea that an effective national output structure functions as an incentive for state-
oriented participation. In contrast, activists experience transnationalization as a 
disincentive, triggering them instead to focus more exclusively on lifestyle politics. 
 
On the basis of our qualitative data we are able to give a deeper understanding of the 
relation between input structures, output structures, and state-oriented action. It allows 
us to investigate why we find a significant effect of the perceived output structure, but 
not of the perceived input structure.  
 Most interviewees indicated that they perceive the input structure as relatively 
responsive towards environmental claims (thus showing less variation than was 
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obtained through the survey interviews). For some of them this is a clear incentive to 
engage in state-oriented action. Most importantly, most respondents indicate that 
environmental issues are gaining political weight, and that this makes politicians 
increasingly more responsive to their concerns. This perception of the political 
context makes some interviewees feel increasingly efficacious about, and prepared to 
engage in, state-oriented action. One member claims: 
 
[Political parties these days] have to be green, they don’t have a choice. In the past, 
they played different cards, like the wellbeing of children and elderly people, but it 
was remarkable that this time [the Belgian local elections of 2012] they all acted 
green. So maybe we did accomplish something there. They have now written down 
that they will address these problems, and it is up to us to monitor that they indeed do 
so. [Interview 9]  
 
Thus, in general respondents think that the input structure is increasingly responsive 
to their environmental concerns. Moreover, some respondents are confident that the 
government is able to turn input responsiveness into effective environmental policies 
as well. Feeling confident about government’s willingness and ability to establish 
effective output clearly incites some members to actively lobby for policy change. 
Referring to their advocacy of a legal ban on the use of pesticides in the maintenance 
of public spaces, a member of the national board argued: 
 
You cannot just set good examples. On a larger scale you need to change some things 
as well, like what happened with the pesticides. (…) The pesticide decree was a result 
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of our lobbying. We showed that pesticides were not necessary. (…) We started a 
movement by setting a positive example and creating public support, and after that we 
addressed public policy. [Interview 11] 
 
Thus, in using lifestyle activism to mobilize public opinion, it was believed that the 
responsiveness of both input and output structures could be maximized through 
combining lifestyle politics and state-oriented action.  
Nonetheless, other respondents were highly skeptical about the effectiveness 
of state-oriented action, making them focus more exclusively on lifestyle politics. 
However, these were not respondents who perceived the input structure as particularly 
closed. In fact, they too confirmed that politicians were increasingly inclined to take 
into account environmental concerns. Instead, rather than being skeptical about the 
input structure, perceiving a less effective output structure was their main motivation 
for avoiding institutional politics. These respondents stated that, even if politicians 
wanted to do something about environmental problems, they most likely would not be 
able to do so, because of a limited ability to draft, or to implement, policies. One 
member, who participated in various environmental advisory boards, but who has in 
recent years started to focus more on lifestyle politics, states: 
 
Yes, I think they [local, federal, and national politicians] all have good intentions, but 
the power to really do something, I do not believe they have that. [Interview 7] 
 
Another member made a similar point: 
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I wouldn’t go as far as to say that it [engaging in institutional politics] is useless … . 
Political parties are open to our concerns, but I have little faith in the workings of 
coalition politics. … I don’t believe in the system’s ability to act. … Instead I think 
we can better do it ourselves. [Interview 1]  
 
These statements illustrate that although a belief in a responsive input structure might 
incite some activists to engage in state-oriented action, it is less powerful in 
explaining why others tempt to avoid it. Namely, it is not the perception of the input 
structure, but skepticism about the output structure that functions as the strongest 
disincentive to engage in the institutional political arena. In other words, lifestyle 
activists sometimes avoid state-oriented action, either because they believe politicians 
have a limited capacity to draft policies, or because they think the state is powerless 
when it comes to the effective implementation of policies.  
To summarize, respondents commonly shared the feeling that Belgium’s input 
structure is responsive to environmental issues. Combined with a sense of confidence 
in the state’s output structure, this is for some respondents a clear incentive for state-
oriented action. However, activists’ perceptions of the input structure cannot explain 
why others do not engage in state-oriented action. In contrast, both the quantitative 
and the qualitative data suggest that perceptions of the output structure help to explain 
this difference instead. While respondents who believe in the state’s ability to act are 
more likely to engage in state-oriented action, respondents who are skeptic about the 
output structure are likely to focus more exclusively on lifestyle politics.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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The aim of this study has been to increase our understanding of why some lifestyle 
activists engage exclusively in lifestyle politics while others engage in state-oriented 
action as well. In particular, it has inquired what role activists’ perceptions of the 
political opportunity structure (POS) play in explaining this difference. To do so, this 
paper has offered an in-depth case-study of a Belgian environmental lifestyle 
movement organization called VELT.  
 Regarding the different forms of engagement operated within VELT, we found 
that two forms of lifestyle politics, social responsibility activism and lifestyle 
mobilization, were operated by the majority of the respondents. Most activists became 
a member of the organization in order to find means to shape their own lifestyles 
according to ecological principles, and the majority of them aimed to persuade the 
general public to also make such lifestyle changes. Only a part of the respondents 
engaged in both lifestyle politics and in state-oriented action. Those who did 
perceived lifestyle politics as a tool to create leverage for state-oriented action. That 
is, these activists believe that through lifestyle politics, they can convince the general 
public to endorse their message, thereby inciting politicians to do so as well. To this 
extent, these findings are in line with recent case-studies (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 
2011; Graziano & Forno, 2012; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010). 
Building on suggestions made by Haydu and Kadanoff (2010), the second aim 
of this paper has been to examine whether activists’ perceptions of the POS can 
explain their propensity for state-oriented action. To do so, we focused on perceptions 
of both input and output structures. The Belgian input structure was generally 
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perceived as open towards environmental concerns. For activists this was a clear 
incentive to engage in both lifestyle politics and state-oriented action. However, it 
became clear that respondents who did not engage in state-oriented action were not 
necessarily more skeptic about the input structure. Instead, the strongest disincentive 
for targeting the institutional political arena appeared to be a lack of trust in the state’s 
ability to address environmental concerns. Those who perceive the Belgian output 
structure as weak portray a tendency to focus more exclusively on lifestyle politics.  
As VELT offers its members the opportunity and the liberty to engage in 
lifestyle politics and state-oriented action according to their personal preferences, it 
offers a most-likely case, that has permitted to explore whether such personal 
preferences are affected by the way activists perceive the POS. It remains to be seen 
whether perceptions of the POS have a similar effect in contexts where activists’ 
opportunity and liberty to draw upon the organization’s tactical repertoire is more 
restricted. Future research should therefore test these findings in such different cases. 
Nonetheless, this study provides indications that the perceived output structure is 
important in explaining lifestyle activists’ propensity for state-oriented action. 
Activists’ concerns about the state’s output structure underscore that the age of 
global governance poses important challenges to democracy. The locus of power is 
increasingly shifting towards international government organizations that are 
characterized by a lack of inclusiveness, resulting in a ‘democratic deficit’ (della 
Porta, 2013; Norris, 2011; Tarrow, 2009). Della Porta (2013) argues that social 
movements play an important role in ‘saving democracy’, as their task is to strive for 
an increased inclusion of citizens in the globalizing political decision making process. 
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To the contrary, activists within lifestyle movement organizations mainly confront the 
challenges of global governance by promoting mantras such as ‘think global, act 
local’ and ‘be the change you want to see in the world’. As such, their tactics do not 
seem to advance the inclusion of citizens in the globalizing political decision making 
process. 
Does this mean that citizens’ increased involvement in lifestyle politics (Stolle 
& Hooghe, 2005, 2011) indicates a decrease of their involvement in in the political 
decision making process? This and other studies (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011; 
Graziano & Forno, 2012; Haydu & Kadanoff, 2010) indicate that this is not 
necessarily the case: lifestyle activists are sometimes involved in state-oriented action 
as well. However, this study also suggests that when presented with those dilemmas 
related to global governance, and the associated democratic deficit, lifestyle activists 
do acquire a tendency to withdraw from the political decision making process, and to 
exclusively focus on the direct diffusion of social change. As such, the democratic 
deficit might challenge the democratic linkage between citizens and the political 
decision making process. In conclusion, we argue that scholars of democracy and 
citizenship should therefore take into account output structures as much as input 
structures when studying the democratic linkage.  
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NOTES 
                                                          
 
 
 
1
 VELT originated in Belgium, but currently has a division in the Netherlands as well. 
2
 VELT was unable to offer a database of its members from which to select respondents. Consequently, 
respondents needed to be contacted through snowball sampling. 
3
 There is a positive, but relatively weak correlation between the two items (.24), confirming that they 
measure a clearly different motivation. 
4
 Three items included in the same battery in the questionnaire do not meet the .50 factor loading 
requirement, and are therefore not included in the sum scale measuring the perceived input structure. 
These items are: “There is a political party that represents my opinions concerning the environment”, “I 
personally know politicians that I can contact whenever I want to address environmental issues”, and 
“Politics often repress environmental movement organizations”. 
5
 In reaction to an earlier version of this paper the issue was raised whether this item and the measure 
of state-oriented action in fact do not measure the same. A correlation of .34 indicates that this is not 
the case. The same accounts for its relation to perceptions of the input structure: with a negative but 
small correlation (-.02) the perceived output structure clearly measures a different attitude.  
6
 Education was coded as follows: 1 = higher education (university and non-university), 0 = no higher 
education (lower and higher education). 
7
 In all models the highest VIF scores is 5.09 and the lowest tolerance statistic is 0.20, indicating that 
no problems with multicollinearity occur. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1: Dates and locations of participant observations and survey 
interviews 
Date  Location Nature of activity Survey 
conducted 
06-12-12 Antwerp Meeting about the introduction of ‘VELT-
ambassadors’, who promote VELT to public 
No  
06-12-12 Antwerp Meeting of the national board of VELT. Main 
subject is the promotion of VELT’s public image 
No 
25-02-13 Wemmel Meeting of members to discuss their participation 
in the ‘open-garden-days’, where they present 
their ecological gardens to the general public 
No 
18-03-13 Heist-op-
den-Berg 
Meeting of local board and general meeting with 
members, discussing the groups course of action  
No 
24-03-13 Antwerp Annual general meeting of VELT. Every local 
chapter is represented by limited number of 
delegates.  
No 
26-03-13 Genk Meeting of local board. Various points, like the 
appointment of new board members, budgets, and 
activities to be organized in the next year 
No 
18-04-13 Halle A course on ecological gardening No 
19-04-13 Brussels VELT has a promotion stand at an annual eco-fair 
called Valeriaan. Several members are present to 
promote VELT to the general public 
No 
29-04-13 Leuven A course organized by VELT on the possibilities 
of small ecological gardens in urban settings 
No 
01-06-13 Puurs ‘Open-garden-days’: members present their 
ecological gardens to the general public 
Yes 
02-06-13 Landskouter ‘Open-garden-days’: members present their 
ecological gardens to the general public 
Yes 
04-06-13 Antwerp A course organized by VELT on the possibilities 
of small ecological gardens in urban contexts 
Yes 
06-06-13 Harelbeke A course by VELT on strategies for consuming 
ecological food 
Yes 
11-06-13 Wespelaar A course organized by VELT  on techniques to 
reduce food waste 
Yes 
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APPENDIX 2: Dates and locations of semi-structured interviews 
# Date Location Function interviewee in VELT 
1 03-01-13 Bierbeek Member local board VELT Leuven 
2 07-01-13 Diest Normal member 
3 14-01-13 Diest Member local board VELT Hageland 
4 14-01-13 Leuven Member local board VELT Hageland 
5 28-01-13 Leuven Member local board VELT Leuven 
6 27-03-13 Brussels Member local board VELT Brussel 
7 09-04-13 Werchter Normal member 
8 19-04-13 Brussels Member of local board VELT Neerbrabant and provincial 
board VELT Vlaams Brabant and Brussels 
9 06-05-13 Londerzeel Member of local board VELT Neerbrabant and provincial 
board VELT Vlaams Brabant and Brussels 
10 13-05-13 Antwerp Member of VELT’s professional core 
11 04-06-13 Antwerp Member of VELT’s professional core 
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APPENDIX 3: Descriptives of survey items 
  
 
 
Item 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
Min. 
max. 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Pearson’s correlations with variables of interest 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
4. 
 
 
5. 
 
6. 
Variables of interest 
 
1. I am a member of VELT to promote an alternative 
lifestyle 
 
73 
 
1-5 
 
4.18 
 
.92 
 
- 
     
2. I am a member of VELT to pressure politicians to make 
changes  
73 1-5 3.05 1.29 .238* -     
3. Perceived input structure (sum-scale) 72 5-22 13.11 2.97 -.209 -.090 -    
4. Output structure  73 1-5 3.62 .97 .267* .341** -.022 -   
5. Politicians in my country are able to solve environmental 
problems 
74 1-5 3.46 1.15 .080 .309** .292* .195 -  
6. International politics are able to solve environmental 
problems 
74 1-5 3.59 1.24 .065 .222 .299* .283* .855*** - 
 
Control variables 
 
          
7) Age 74 29-
80 
49.59 11.86 -.004 -.222 .295** .010 -.024 -.043 
8) Education (1 = higher education) 74 0-1 .70 .46 -.166 .051 -.067 -.033 -.023 -.094 
9) Sex (1 = female) 74 0-1 .57 .50 .051 .081 -.100 .032 .304** .156 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Crosstab of Motivation for Participation 
 
 
I am a member of 
VELT to promote an 
alternative lifestyle 
 
I am a member of VELT to pressure politicians to make changes 
 
(1) 
Totally 
disagree 
 
 
 
(2) 
Disagree 
 
(3)  
Agree 
nor 
disagree 
 
 
 
(4)  
Agree 
 
 
(5)  
Totally 
agree 
 
 
Total 
(percent) 
(1) Totally disagree 1 1 0 0 0 2 (2.8) 
(2) Disagree 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2.8) 
(3) Agree nor disagree 1 0 3 2 1 7 (9.7) 
(4) Agree  7 2 16 4 3 32 (43.1) 
(5) Totally agree 4 4 5 10 7 30 (41.7) 
       
Total (percent) 13 
(16.7) 
8 
 (11.1) 
25 
(34.7) 
16 
(22.2) 
11 
(15.3) 
73 (100) 
Fisher’s exact p-value = .065 
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Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Perceived Input Structure 
Item Perceived Political 
Opportunity Structure 
1) Politicians take into account citizens’ environmental 
concerns 
.76 
2) Environmental problems get a lot of attention in politics .80 
3) Environmental problems are disregarded in politics 
(reversed) 
.71 
4) The political party that represents my concerns about the 
environment has a strong impact on public policy 
.68 
5) Politics support environmental organizations in our 
country 
.57 
Eigenvalue 
Explained Variance 
2.51 
.50 
Note: Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.74. N = 70 
 
   
39 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression of motivation to pressure politicians 
 I am a member of VELT to pressure politicians to make 
changes 
Model I Model II 
Predictor β Odds ratio β Odds ratio 
Age -.038* (.021) .962* (.020) -.046** (.022) .955** (.021) 
Education (1 = higher 
education) 
-.158 (.540) .854 (.461) -.157 (.564) .854 (.482) 
Sex (1 = female) .053 (.465) 1.054 (.490) -.676 (.524) .509 (.266) 
     
Perceived Input Structure -.009 (.071) .991 (.070) -.059 (.079) .942 (.074) 
Perceived Output 
Structure 
 
.660*** 
(.242) 
1.935*** 
(.469) 
.736*** (.263) 2.089*** 
(.550) 
Politicians in my country 
can solve 
 environmental 
problems 
 1.287 *** 
(.423) 
 
3.623*** 
(.1.534) 
 
International politics can 
solve  environmental 
problems 
-.736* (.263) .493* (.182) 
N 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 
Log pseudolikelyhood 
70 
.06 
-101.028 
70 
.11 
-95.340 
Note: *p < .10, **p < . 05, ***p < .01. Coefficients are ordered log-odds. Standard errors between 
brackets. A Brant test shows no significant results, indicating that a one-equation model is valid. 
 
